The unanimous Supreme Court judgment in Brown v Ridley [2025] UKSC 7 has clarified the ten-year requirement for reasonable belief in adverse possession claims.
Background: adverse possession and the ten-year rule
The enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 (the “LRA”) significantly increased the difficulty of making a successful adverse possession claim - colloquially known as obtaining “squatters’ rights”.
To make a successful claim against registered land, the squatter must first have occupied the land for ten years without the registered proprietor’s consent. At that point, the squatter may apply to HM Land Registry to be registered as the owner of that land. HM Land Registry’s first duty is to give notice of the application to the registered proprietor and any other interested parties, such as mortgage lenders. If the registered proprietor opposes the application, the applicant must be able to meet one of three conditions – set out in Schedule 6 of the LRA – if they are to be successful.
The relevant condition in the case of Brown v Ridley includes the term under paragraph 5(4)(c) of Schedule 6 that:
“for at least ten years of the period of adverse possession ending on the date of the application, the applicant (or any predecessor in title) reasonably believed that the land to which the application relates belonged to him” (emphasis added).
Prior to Brown v Ridley, the courts generally took the above provision to mean that the ten-year period of reasonable belief had to continue up to the date of the application. This interpretation caused difficulties for applicants who had learned that the land in question belonged to the registered proprietor shortly before making their application.
Brown v Ridley – the facts
Mr Brown is the registered owner of land in County Durham (the “Brown Land”), having bought it in 2002. Mr and Mrs Ridley are the registered owners of a neighbouring plot of land, known as Valley View, which they purchased in 2004.
A previous owner of Valley View had erected a fence and planted a hedge along what he believed to be the boundary between the Brown Land and Valley View. In doing so, he enclosed a strip of the registered Brown Land (the “Disputed Land”).
The Ridleys used the Disputed Land initially as part of Valley View’s garden and later as part of the site for the erection of a new house. Planning permission for the new house was granted in early 2018. The fence and hedge were then removed in preparation for the construction work.
In October 2019, Mr Brown gave notice to the Ridleys that he considered the construction work to be in breach of the Party Wall Act 1996. In December 2019, the Ridleys applied to HM Land Registry to be registered as owners of the Disputed Land on the grounds that they had been in adverse possession of it for fifteen years and had had the reasonable belief that it was their land for at least ten years. Mr Brown objected to their application.
HM Land Registry referred the matter to the First-Tier Tribunal, which found in favour of the Ridleys. Mr Brown successfully appealed to the Upper Tribunal, which was bound by a Court of Appeal decision (Zarb v Parry [2011] EWCA Civ 1306). The Ridleys appealed to the Supreme Court.
Judgment of the Supreme Court
In the leading judgment, Lord Briggs acknowledged that the wording of paragraph 5(4)(c) could be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is that the ten-year period of reasonable belief must continue up to the date of the application (“Construction A”). The second interpretation is that there must simply be a ten-year period of reasonable belief within the period of adverse possession, which need not necessarily continue to the date of the application (“Construction B”).
Lord Briggs acknowledged that the LRA was drafted to restrict the circumstances in which adverse possession claims could successfully be made. However, it was not Parliament’s intention to remove all scope for obtaining land in this way.
It was held that paragraph 5(4)(c) had been drafted on the basis that squatters should not be able to obtain the registered title of land where they knew that they were in possession without any right. However, the provision need not be interpreted per Construction A for it to have this effect. In fact, a typical applicant wishing to satisfy this condition would only contemplate making an application after being disabused of their reasonable belief. Such an applicant could not possibly be expect to make an application on the same day as they lose their reasonable belief, which is what Construction A appears to require.
As such, Construction A would render the route to registration provided by paragraph 5(4)(c) largely illusory and Construction B must be the correct interpretation.
Implications of the judgment
The judgment gives applicants for adverse possession greater flexibility in making their claims. It also highlights the importance to landowners of monitoring their boundaries and resolving any uncertainties to avoid costly adverse possession disputes.
If you have any questions regarding adverse possession, please contact Stephen Dean by email at Stephen.Dean@LBMW.com or call our Dispute Resolution team on 0207 222 5381.